En juin 1988, paraît dans Nature un article où est affirmée la possibilité d'un effet moléculaire sans présence physique de molécule ; l'eau se comporterait comme un support liquide sur laquelle des signaux moléculaires pourraient être enregistrés. Cette thèse est soutenue par Jacques Benveniste, un chercheur de l'Inserm alors reconnu pour ses travaux sur les médiateurs de l'allergie. Le jour de la parution de l'article, le journal Le Monde parle d'une découverte qui "pourrait bouleverser les fondements de la physique". C'est (...) le début d'une immense polémique à laquelle Luc Montagnier, prix Nobel de médecine en 2008, a redonné récemment une certaine actualité. L'objectif de ce livre est de proposer un éclairage sociologique sur cette controverse. Après une description des étapes de la controverse, l'auteur s'attache à démontrer que le contenu des arguments et des contre-arguments qui font la trame de la dispute renvoie à des conceptions divergentes des modalités de mise en oeuvre des normes au principe du jugement scientifique. Aucun des protagonistes ne remet complètement en cause ces normes, mais tous s'affrontent sur la façon dont il convient de les mettre en oeuvre. C'est à la découverte des coulisses du processus de légitimation d'une thèse scientifique que le lecteur est convié à partir de l'étude de cette controverse qui a notamment contribué à relancer les débats sur l'homéopathie. (shrink)

Marx says of alienated labor that it does not "belong" to the worker, that it issues in a product that does not belong to her, and that it is unfulfilling, unfree, egoistically motivated, and inhuman. He seems to think, moreover, that the first of these features grounds all the others. All of these features seem quite independent, however: they can come apart; they share no obvious common cause or explanation; and if they often occur together this seems accidental. It is (...) not clear, then, how Marx's concept of alienated labor could possess the strong unity which he takes it to have. I defend a reinterpretation of the concept which explains this unity. The various features of alienated labor, I argue, all follow from a single, hitherto underappreciated feature of its formal motivational structure: the fact that such labor is motivated not by its product but by an incentive. (shrink)

Presents results of free‐recall experiments conducted in France, Gabon and Nepal, to test predictions of a cognitive model of religious concepts. The world over, these concepts include violations of conceptual expectations at the level of domain knowledge (e.g., about ‘animal’ or ‘artifact’ or ‘person’) rather than at the basic level. In five studies we used narratives to test the hypothesis that domain‐level violations are recalled better than other conceptual associations. These studies used material constructed in the same way as religious (...) concepts, but not used in religions familiar to the subjects. Experiments 1 and 2 confirmed a distinctiveness effect for such material. Experiment 3 shows that recall also depends on the possibility to generate inferences from violations of domain expectations. Replications in Gabon (Exp. 4) and Nepal (Exp. 5) showed that recall for domain‐level violations is better than for violations of basic‐level expectations. Overall sensitivity to violations is similar in different cultures and produces similar recall effects, despite differences in commitment to religious belief, in the range of local religious concepts or in their mode of transmission. However, differences between Gabon and Nepal results suggest that familiarity with some types of domain‐level violations may paradoxically make other types more salient. These results suggest that recall effects may account for the recurrent features found in religious concepts from different cultures. (shrink)

Ritualized behavior, intuitively recognizable by its stereotypy, rigidity, repetition, and apparent lack of rational motivation, is found in a variety of life conditions, customs, and everyday practices: in cultural rituals, whether religious or non-religious; in many children's complicated routines; in the pathology of obsessive-compulsive disorders (OCD); in normal adults around certain stages of the life-cycle, birthing in particular. Combining evidence from evolutionary anthropology, neuropsychology and neuroimaging, we propose an explanation of ritualized behavior in terms of an evolved Precaution System geared (...) to the detection of and reaction to inferred threats to fitness. This system, distinct from fear-systems geared to respond to manifest danger, includes a repertoire of clues for potential danger as well as a repertoire of species-typical precautions. In OCD pathology, this system does not supply a negative feedback to the appraisal of potential threats, resulting in doubts about the proper performance of precautions, and repetition of action. Also, anxiety levels focus the attention on low-level gestural units of behavior rather than on the goal-related higher-level units normally used in parsing the action-flow. Normally automatized actions are submitted to cognitive control. This “swamps” working memory, an effect of which is a temporary relief from intrusions but also their long-term strengthening. Normal activation of this Precaution System explains intrusions and ritual behaviors in normal adults. Gradual calibration of the system occurs through childhood rituals. Cultural mimicry of this system's normal input makes cultural rituals attention-grabbing and compelling. A number of empirical predictions follow from this synthetic model. (Published Online February 8 2007) Key Words: childhood ritual; compulsion; event boundaries; evolutionary psychology; obsessive-compulsive disorder; ritual; thought intrusion. (shrink)

Ownership is universal and ubiquitous in human societies, yet the psychology underpinning ownership intuitions is generally not described in a coherent and computationally tractable manner. Ownership intuitions are commonly assumed to derive from culturally transmitted social norms, or from a mentally represented implicit theory. While the social norms account is entirelyad hoc, the mental theory requires prior assumptions about possession and ownership that must be explained. Here I propose such an explanation, arguing that the intuitions result from the interaction of (...) two cognitive systems. One of these handles competitive interactions for the possession of resources observed in many species including humans. The other handles mutually beneficial cooperation between agents, as observed in communal sharing, collective action and trade. Together, these systems attend to specific cues in the environment, and produce definite intuitions such as “this is hers,” “that is not mine.” This computational model provides an explanation for ownership intuitions, not just in straightforward cases of property, but also in disputed ownership (squatters, indigenous rights), historical changes (abolition of slavery), as well as apparently marginal cases, such as the questions, whether people own their seats on the bus, or their places in a queue, and how people understand “cultural appropriation” and slavery. In contrast to some previous theories, the model is empirically testable and free ofad hocstipulations. (shrink)

The domain of “folk-economics” consists in explicit beliefs about the economy held by laypeople, untrained in economics, about such topics as, for example, the causes of the wealth of nations, the benefits or drawbacks of markets and international trade, the effects of regulation, the origins of inequality, the connection between work and wages, the economic consequences of immigration, or the possible causes of unemployment. These beliefs are crucial in forming people's political beliefs and in shaping their reception of different policies. (...) Yet, they often conflict with elementary principles of economic theory and are often described as the consequences of ignorance, irrationality, or specific biases. As we will argue, these past perspectives fail to predict the particular contents of popular folk-economic beliefs and, as a result, there is no systematic study of the cognitive factors involved in their emergence and cultural success. Here we propose that the cultural success of particular beliefs about the economy is predictable if we consider the influence of specialized, largely automatic inference systems that evolved as adaptations to ancestral human small-scale sociality. These systems, for which there is independent evidence, include free-rider detection, fairness-based partner choice, ownership intuitions, coalitional psychology, and more. Information about modern mass-market conditions activates these specific inference systems, resulting in particular intuitions, for example, that impersonal transactions are dangerous or that international trade is a zero-sum game. These intuitions in turn make specific policy proposals more likely than others to become intuitively compelling, and, as a consequence, exert a crucial influence on political choices. (shrink)

Religions “in the wild” are the varied set of religious activities that occurred before the emergence of organized religions with doctrines, or that persist at the margins of those organized traditions. These religious activities mostly focus on misfortune; on how to remedy specific cases of illness, accidents, failures; and on how to prevent them. I present a general model to account for the cross-cultural recurrence of these particular themes. The model is based on features of human psychology—namely, epistemic vigilance, the (...) set of systems whereby we evaluate the quality of information and of sources of information, and threat-detection psychology, the set of evolved systems geared at detecting potential danger in the environment. Given these two sets of systems, the dynamics of communication will favor particular types of messages about misfortune. This makes it possible to predict recurrent features of religious systems, such as the focus on nonphysical agents, the focus on particular cases rather than general aspects of misfortune, and the emergence of specialists. The model could illuminate not just why such representations are culturally successful, but also why people are motivated to formulate them in the first place. (shrink)

Paul Ricœur made a lot to introduce analytic philosophy in France during the 70s and 80s, and he engaged in a dialogue with a number of authors from this tradition, such as Austin, Strawson, Davidson or Parfit. This dialogue, though, was one-sided, since there was no discussion of his views by analytic philosophers. Moreover, Ricœur often misunderstood or misprepresented the analytic views that he was discussing. So in many ways the Ricœur’s encounter with analytic philosophy was unsuccessful, which does not (...) mean that Ricœur’s discussions where unfruitful for his own work. Résumé Paul Ricœur a fait beaucoup pour introduire la philosophie analytique en France pendant les années 1970 et 1980, et il a entrepris un dialogue avec les auteurs de cette tradition, comme Austin, Strawson, Davidson ou Parfit. Mais ce dialogue est cependant resté unilatéral, car il n’y a pas eu de discussion des thèses de Ricœur au sein de la tradition analytique. De plus Ricœur a souvent mécompris les vues analytiques qu’il discutait. En ce sens il n’y a pas eu de rencontre entre Ricœur et les philosophes analytiques, ce qui ne veut pas dire que les discussions par Ricœur des philosophes anaytiques n’aient pas été fructueuses pour son œuvre propre. (shrink)

Cognitive developmental evidence is sometimes conscripted to support ''naturalized epistemology'' arguments to the effect that a general epistemic stance leads children to build theory-like accounts of underlying properties of kinds. A review of the evidence suggests that what prompts conceptual acquisition is not a general epistemic stance but a series of category-specific intuitive principles that constitute an evolved ''natural metaphysics''. This consists in a system of categories and category-specific inferential processes founded on definite biases in prototype formation. Evidence for this (...) system provides a better understanding of the limited ''plasticity'' of ontological commitments as well as a computationally plausible account of their initial state, avoiding ambiguities about innateness. This may provide a starting point for a ''naturalized epistemology'' that takes into account evolved properties of human conceptual structures. (shrink)

the article suggests understanding(including) better the professionalization of the formative activities and the professional activities by an approach which articulates three levels of analysis: macro (historic construction and social construction of the knowledges of the activity), méso (institutional devices (plans) of training (formation) and work) and microphone(microcomputing) (lived on the subjects, the individual dynamics). This reflection leans on the presentation (display) of various processes of professionalization stemming from empirical searches (researches) realized by the author. l’article propose de mieux comprendre la (...) professionnalisation des activités formatives et des activités professionnelles par une approche qui articule trois niveaux d’analyse: macro (construction historique et construction sociale des savoirs de l’activité), méso (dispositifs institutionnels de formation et de travail) et micro (vécu des sujets, dynamiques individuelles). Cette réflexion s’appuie sur la présentation de différents processus de professionnalisation issus de recherches empiriques réalisées par l’auteur. (shrink)

In order to study the relationship between genes and diseases, the increasing availability and sharing of phenotypic and genotypic data have been promoted as an imperative within the scientific community. In parallel with data sharing practices by clinicians and researchers, recent initiatives have been observed in which individuals are sharing personal genomic data. The involvement of individuals in such initiatives is facilitated by the increased accessibility of personal genomic data, offered by private test providers along with availability of online networks. (...) Personal webpages and on-line data sharing platforms such as Consent to Research, Free the Data, and Genomes Unzipped are being utilized to host and share genotypes, electronic health records and family history uploaded by individuals. Although personal genomic data sharing initiatives vary in nature, the emphasis on the individuals’ control on their data in order to benefit research and ultimately health care has seen as a key theme across these initiatives. In line with the growing practice of personal genomic data sharing, this paper aims to shed light on the potential challenges surrounding these initiatives. As in the course of these initiatives individuals are solicited to individually balance the risks and benefits of sharing their genomic data, their awareness of the implications of personal genomic data sharing for themselves and their family members is a necessity. Furthermore, given the sensitivity of genomic data and the controversies around their complete de-identifiability, potential privacy risks and harms originating from unintended uses of data have to be taken into consideration. (shrink)

I argue that the normative dimension in mental content does not figure in the content as a direct feature of this content. But I do not take is as an extrinsic feature due to the properties of our ascriptions either. I suggest that the normativity has to do with the possibility of self attribution of mental states. The views of Robert Brandom are examined in this respect.

This paper argues that the normative dimension in mental and semantic content is not a categorical feature of content, but an hypothetical one, relative to the features of the interpretation of thoughts and meaning. The views of Robert Brandom are discussed. The thesis defended in this paper is not interpretationist about thought. It implies that the normative dimension of content arises from the real capacity of thinkers and speakers to self ascribe thoughts to themselves and to reach self knowledge of (...) their own thoughts. (shrink)

The author recalls some of the reasons why analytical philosophy has been foreign to contemporary fre philosophical tradition. Presenting some recent work by contemporary fre philosophers influenced by analytic philosophy, He shows that most of them share the view that philosophy is a kind of transcendental inquiry on the nature and limits of language, And that recent trends in analytical philosophy, Such as scientific realism and "naturalised epistemology" are not well represented in france.

In reply to commentary on our target article, we supply further evidence and hypotheses in the description of ritualized behaviors in humans. Reactions to indirect fitness threats probably activate specialized precaution systems rather than a unified form of danger-avoidance or causal reasoning. Impairment of precaution systems may be present in pathologies other than obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD), autism in particular. Ritualized behavior is attention-grabbing enough to be culturally transmitted whether or not it is associated with group identity, cohesion, or with any (...) other social aspect of collective ceremonies. (Published Online February 8 2007). (shrink)

La figure de l'individu, qui a dominé la philosophie et les sciences sociales au cours des trois dernières décennies, semble à bout de souffle. Partout, singuliers et collectifs cherchent à dépasser la simple adaptation au monde fluide imposé par le capitalisme mondialisé et à redevenir les agents de leur propre vie. Au nord comme au sud, un immense désir de subjectivation est en train de gagner nos sociétés. Pourtant, la figure du sujet reste confuse. Longtemps identifiée à une entité naturelle, (...) hors de l'histoire, elle pâtit aujourd'hui également des représentations, tout aussi néfastes, qui concluent de l'historicité radicale du sujet à sa relativité éthique et politique, voire à son inexistence. Ce livre reprend, à la racine, la réflexion sur les relations entre sujet et histoire, en y réintroduisant une tradition oubliée, sinon refoulée par la philosophie : celle qui commence avec Humboldt, se poursuit chez Saussure, Benveniste et Meschonnic. En définissant le langage comme activité et comme mise en circulation de puissances poétiques, cette tradition fournit les bases d'une nouvelle anthropologie historique du sujet. (shrink)

L’une des raisons pour lesquelles la vérité et la démocratie ne semblent pas faire bon ménage est qu’on a tendance à confondre, d’une part, la liberté d’opinion et de parole avec l’égale vérité des opinions, ce qui revient à adopter une forme de relativisme, et, d’autre part, la règle de majorité avec une règle de vérité, ce qui revient à adopter une forme de théorie de la vérité comme consensus. Parce que la démocratie libérale repose sur le principe de la (...) pluralité des valeurs et sur la neutralité axiologique, on a tendance à penser qu’elle exige de traiter toutes les opinions comme également respectables et, moyennant une confusion de plus, comme également vraies. Parce que la démocratie suppose la règle selon laquelle, en matière de décisions, la majorité doit l’emporter, on suppose que les opinions majoritaires ont le plus de chances d’être vraies, et qu’elles sont vraies parce qu’elles sont celles de la majorité. (shrink)

A commonplace in contemporary philosophy is that mental content has normative properties. A number of writers associate this view to the idea that the normativity of content is essentially connected to its social character. I agree with the first thesis, but disagree with the second. The paper examines three kinds of views according to which the norms of thought and content are social: Wittgenstein’s rule following considerations, Davidson’s triangulation argument, and Brandom’s inferential pragmatics, and criticises each. It is argued that (...) there are objective conceptual norms constitutive of mental content, but that these are not essentially social. (shrink)

This paper analyses Davidson's conception of the norms of rationality which govern, according to him, the interpretation of mind and action. While I accept Davidson's thesis that there are norms of the mental, I disagree with him on their scope. It is argued that there are much more specific norms for concepts, and that belief in partiuclar is governed by a norm of truth.

How might good work – skilled, autonomous work which affords workers opportunities for meaningful social cooperation in decent conditions – be made available to all? I evaluate five commonly advanced strategies: an unregulated labor market, egalitarian redistribution of resources, state regulation, collective bargaining, and workplace democracy. Each, I argue, has significant limitations. An unregulated labor market ignores workers' unduly weak bargaining power vis-à-vis employers. Egalitarian redistribution alone fails to solve this problem due to distinctive and endemic imperfections of labor markets. (...) Direct state regulation is insufficiently context-sensitive and insufficiently dynamic in the face of technological and other developments. Collective bargaining gives workers only indirect and sometimes costly influence over their working conditions. And workplace democracy leaves workers vulnerable to collective action problems induced by competition between firms. I argue, however, that these strategies can be complemented in a promising way by ‘syndicalist economic democracy’: direct worker participation in the government of the economy, largely specific to particular occupations or economic sectors but above the level of the individual workplace. (shrink)

Ce texte est la suite d'une réflexion présentée ici. La matière comme flux Dans Le Rêve de d'Alembert (1769) et dans les Principes philosophiques sur la matière et le mouvement (vers 1770), Diderot reprend la question en l'approfondissant à nouveau. Il ne s'agit plus seulement d'affirmer que la nature est d'essence matérielle mais, en s'enfonçant en quelque sorte encore un peu plus dans le réel, de comprendre l'essence de la matière elle-même. D'Alembert et lui s'accordent sur l'idée que celle-ci est (...) (...) - Philosophie – Nouvel article. (shrink)

Ce texte est la suite d'une réflexion présentée ici. La nature comme flux Comme ses prédécesseurs, Diderot élabore une philosophie de la nature qui est aussi une philosophie de la religion et une philosophie de la connaissance. Dès 1747, dans La Promenade du sceptique, même s'il ne prend pas encore parti dans les débats qui y opposent le déiste et l'athée à propos de la Nature et de Dieu, il montre qu'il est tout à fait possible de tenir une position (...) indépendante de tout finalisme, que ce soit le (...) - Philosophie – Nouvel article. (shrink)

Ce texte est la suite d'une réflexion engagée ici. Vers une théorie rythmique du langage ? Les critiques qui viennent d'être présentées débouchent sur un ensemble de thèses que je voudrais maintenant analyser en détail avant d'en faire la critique. Première thèse : Spinoza présupposerait, sans jamais toutefois l'exposer directement, une théorie du langage proche de celle qui émergera par la suite chez Humboldt puis se développera chez Saussure, Benveniste et lui-même. Cette théorie apparaîtrait, en (...) - Philosophie – Nouvel (...) article. (shrink)

O artigo se contrapõe a estudos recentes sobre o ceticismo seis-centista ao sustentar que ao invés de romper com a épochè este ceticismo de fato a fortalece. O artigo sugere duas razões para esta interpretação equivocada do ceticismo do século dezessete: uma in-fluência das visões cartesiana e pascaliana do ceticismo nestes estudos e a suposição que o ceticismo mais relevante no período é mais pirrônico do que acadêmico.Contrary to what has been proposed in recent literature, the ar-ticle argues that early (...) modern skepticism, rather than breaking with the central notion in ancient skepticism of épochè in fact fortifies this notion. The article suggests two reasons for the mistaken view of early modern skepticism: the influence of Descartes’ and Pascal’s views of skepticism and the supposition that Pyrrhonian skepti-cism is more relevant in the period than Academic skepticism. (shrink)

Plutôt que de rouvrir l'éternel débat entre tenants d'une histoire analytique de la philosophie et tenants d'une approche « authentiquement historique », il vaut mieux se demander si les premiers sont réellement condamnés à la trahison historique, et les seconds à la myopie historique. La démarche consistant à aborder le passé de la philosophie d'aval en amont est compatible avec une fidélité historique dès lors qu'on est prêt à reconnaître que ce ne sont pas seulement des textes qui se transmettent (...) à l'intérieur d'une tradition, mais des arguments, et que ceux-ci peuvent passer d'une tradition à l'autre. Instead of reopening the eternal debate between the partisans of an « analytical » approach to the history of philosophy and the partisans of an « genuinely historical » approach, let us rather ask ourselves whether the former are necessarily condemned to betray history and the latter condemned to historical myopia. Approaching the past of philosophy from downstream to upstream is compatible with a fidelity to history once we acknowledge the fact that not only texts, but also arguments are passed on within a tradition and outside it. (shrink)

Il arrive souvent, quand on discute de questions portant sur la théorie de la connaissance, que l’on utilise des concepts qui ont une consonance éthique. On se demande ce qui distingue une bonne hypothèse d’une mauvaise, ou si nous devrions croire ceci ou cela sur la base des données..

Elaboramos una versión del disposicionalismo experimental que esclarece la relación entre capacidades y leyes fenomenológicas. Tras algunas consideraciones introductorias, presentamos el disposicionalismo experimental en vistas de las nociones de modalidad física y ambiente de estímulo. Trazamos las líneas generales para una epistemología experimentalista de las capacidades y esclarecemos la modalidad física e invariancia de las leyes fenomenológicas. Luego examinamos las generalizaciones físicas y extrapolaciones de las leyes fenomenológicas y exponemos el caso de la ley de Fresnel, que ilustra aspectos de (...) nuestro argumento. Concluimos con algunas consideraciones sobre los límites del disposicionalismo experimental. (shrink)

À partir d’une typologie des formes de connaissance, je soutiens qu’il y a trois formes principales de connaissance littéraire : cognitive propositionnelle, affective et pratique. La conception propositionnelle est erronée : la littérature ne fournit pas directement une forme de savoir que. La conception affective ou expressiviste peut au mieux dire qu’il y a des effets cognitifs des oeuvres littéraires. La conception pratique a le plus de chances d’être correcte, mais seulement si l’on accepte l’idée que le savoir pratique est (...) en partie basé sur le savoir propositionnel. Starting from a typology of kinds of knowledge, I argue that there are three basic conceptions of literary knowledge : cognitive propositional, affective, and practical. The cognitive conception is misguided : literary knowledge cannot be directly a form of knowledge that. The affective or expressivist conception is too weak : it can at best amount to the idea that there are cognitive effects of literary works. The practical conception is the most promising, but only if one accepts that knowing how is partly based on knowing that and propositional knowledge. (shrink)

Dans un roman d’anticipation qu’il situe en 19201, Alfred Jarry invente le personnage d’André Marcueuil, capable d’aller « au-delà des forces humaines », tant sexuelles que cyclistes. Durant la futuriste « course des dix mille milles »2, une quintuplette, sur laquelle pédalent cinq champions cyclistes, distance, grâce à un développement de « cinquante-sept mètres trente-quatre »,..